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DISCOVERY OF EXPERT OPINION IN LAND CONDEMNATION
PROCEEDINGS
In the past federal district courts in applying the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure have generally refused to' permit discovery of the
opinions of expert real estate appraisers employed by the Government in
land condemnation proceedings.1 This is not to say that all discovery has
been categorically denied. Several courts have allowed discovery of lists
containing comparable sales of property which the parties intended to
utilize as evidence,2 while others have permitted access to factual criteria
such as governmental safety regulations which were essential to proper
valuation.' Yet, efforts to obtain the expert's appraisal report have met
with infrequent success. These decisions have resulted largely from in-
terpretations of the Supreme Court holding in Hickman v. Taylor4 and
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. However, in a recent case, United
States v. 364.82 Acres of Land,' the court permitted complete opinion dis-
covery on the basis of policy considerations which it found inherent in
the right of eminent domain and the condemnation proceeding by which
that right is exercised.
Although expert opinion discovery is a procedural problem requir-
ing analysis within the context of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
policy issues certainly should not be divorced from a consideration of the
problem. As stated by Judge Kirkpatrick:
1. See, e.g., United States v. 4.724 Acres of Land, 31 F.R.D. 290 (E.D. La. 1962);
United States v. 900.57 Acres of Land, 30 F.R.D. 512 (W.D. Ark. 1962) ; United States
v. 19.897 Acres of Land, 27 F.R.D. 420 (E.D.N.Y. 1961) ; United States v. 7534.04 Acres
of Land, 18 F.R.D. 146 (N.D. Ga. 1954) ; United States v. Certain Parcels of Land, 18
F.R.D. 98 (M.D. Ga. 1955); Hickey v. United States, 18 F.R.D. 88 (E.D. Pa. 1952).
In United States v. 50.34 Acres of Land, 13 F.R.D. 19 (E.D.N.Y. 1952) discovery was
allowed but in a subsequent hearing to determine the permissible scope of discovery, the
court denied access to opinions. United States v. 50.34 Acres of Land, 12 F.R.D. 440
(E.D.N.Y. 1952).
2. See, e.g., United States v. 3,595.98 Acres of Land, 212 F. Supp. 617 (N.D. Cal.
1962); United States v. 19.897 Acres of Land, 27 F.R.D. 420 (E.D.N.Y. 1961).
3. See, e.g., United States v. 62.50 Acres of Land, 23 F.R.D. 287 (N.D. Ohio
1959), in which the court permitted the condemnee to inquire as to the existence of gov-
ernmental safety regulations on the ground that such regulations could affect the value
of the property which had not been condemned.
4. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
5. 38 F.R.D. 411 (N.D. Cal. 1965). Specifically, the Government was resisting
discovery of (1) the appraiser's opinion of the value of the property; (2) the appraiser's
opinion of the highest and best use of the property; (3) any matter of opinion or con-
clusion reached upon consideration of facts ascertained by the appraiser; (4) any writ-
ten reports that the appraiser may have submitted to any agency of the United States
Government; and (5) any matter presumably within the knowledge of the defendants.
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There is nothing mandatory about the discovery provisions
of the Rules. On the contrary, the purpose and intent is evident
throughout to leave their application to the discretion of the trial
court-not of course an absolute discretion but one controlled
and governed, not only by statutory enactments and the well
established rules of the common law, but also by considerations
of policy and of necessity, propriety and expediency in the par-
ticular case at hand.' (Emphasis added.)
I. TRADITIONAL ARGUMENTS
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure prescribe a policy of liberal
allowance of discovery. Therefore, any argument for non-allowance
must be persuasive to prompt an exception from that policy. Most of the
decisions denying opinion discovery rest on one or more of six argu-
ments, none of which has escaped criticism.'
Attorney-Client Privilege.
The attorney-client privilege has been extended by some courts to
encompass conclusions of experts employed by counsel in trial prepara-
tion.' The rationale of the privilege is that disputes resulting in litiga-
tion can be most adequately handled by attorneys who have been fully
advised of the facts by their clients and that complete disclosure will be
facilitated by a guarantee that the client's communications cannot be
elicited from his attorney over the client's objection.' It is difficult to see
how this policy is furthered by an extension of the immunity to opinions
of experts. Apparently the courts view the client, attorney and expert
as a "team" wherein the client reveals the factual cciteria to the expert,
who determines which factors are relevant to valuadon, translates these
facts into monetary values, and communicates the results to the attorney
in the form of an appraisal report." This argument incorrectly assumes
that the attorney-client privilege protects an individual's knowledge as
well as his communications; it does not protect the client's knowledge and
certainly should not immunize that of his expert." One who is aware of
6. United States v. Kohler Co., 9 F.R.D. 289, 291 (E.D. Pa. 1949).
7. See, e.g., United States v. 23.76 Acres of Land, 32 F.R.D. 593, 597 (D. Md.
1963).
S. See, e.g., Cold Metal Process Co. v. Aluminum Co. ol America, 7 F.R.D. 684
(D. Mass. 1947).
9. McCoRMIcx, EVIDENCE § 91 (1954).
10. See Friedenthal, Discovery and Use of an Adverse Pa,-ty's Expert Information,
14 STAN. L. R.Ev. 455, 463-68 (1962), for a review of state court decisions applying the
attorney-client privilege to empert witnesses on the ground that the expert is a mere in-
terpreter without whom neither the attorney nor his client could understand the signifi-
cance of the client's information.
11. Id. at 463.
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relevant matters cannot, merely by communicating them to his attorney,
preclude their discovery. 2 The expert's opinions gathered through his
independent observations have no relationship to the privilege, and the
expert cannot alter this merely by revealing his findings to the attorney
in his appraisal report. Therefore, the expert's subjective analysis should
not be protected on attorney-client privilege grounds.
Work Product.
The doctrine of work product which some consider an extension of
the attorney-client privilege18 and others regard as a separate rule of
public policy' 4 grew out of the Supreme Court's decision in Hickman v.
Taylor. 5 In that case, discovery was sought of reports in the attorney's
possession which concerned interviews with eyewitnesses to the event.
The Court held that, although not within the attorney-client privilege, the
reports were immune from discovery on the ground that they were the
private memoranda and personal recollections prepared by counsel in the
course of his legal duties, which, if subject to discovery, would discourage
him from adequate preparation of the case. The Court dealt solely with
the work product of the attorney, and no reference was made to agents
or third party witnesses.
Subsequently the scope of work product immunity was extended in
Alltmont v. United States"'6 to include work done by his agents for coun-
sel's use. The justification was that work product was created to insure
adequate trial preparation by the attorney and that allowance of discov-
ery of his agent's reports might compel the attorney to perform the trivial
work in order to protect it as work product, which would limit the time
he could otherwise spend on work requiring legal expertise. This would
adversely affect his preparation of the case and would, therefore, con-
flict with the primary purpose of the work product doctrine.
The natural consequence of Alltmont was a further expansion of
work product to encompass expert witnesses.' Again the policy consid-
eration was adequate trial preparation by counsel. However, the justifi-
cation for protecting agents is not applicable to experts. The attorney
12. Ibid. A party who has in his possession documents which he could be com-
pelled to produce cannot make them privileged against production -by putting them in the
custody of his attorney. Falsone v. United States, 205 F.2d 734, 739 (5th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 346 U.S. 864 (1953).
13. See, e.g., Goldstein, The Discovery Process in Highway Land Acqzdsition, 14
Am. U. L. Rlv. 38, 48 (1964).
14. See, e.g., Snyder v. United States, 20 F.R.D. 7, 8 (E.D.N.Y. 1956).
15. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
16. 177 F.2d 971 (3d Cir. 1949).
17. See, e.g., United Air Lines, Inc. v. United States, 26 F.R.D. 213, 218 (D. Del.
1960).
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obviously cannot perform the expert's duties as he can the agent's tasks,
so there is no danger that he will neglect his primary duties in order to
immunize the expert's conclusions from discovery. Therefore, even if
Alltmont were a natural and appropriate response to Hickman, it offers
no justification for the immunity of experts.
Although one can consistently include agents and exclude experts
from the scope of work product, some courts"8 have analyzed the expan-
sion on a more fundamental ground by interpreting Hickman as extend-
ing work product coverage only to matters requiring the attorney's pro-
fessional skill and experience rather than to all matters prepared by the
attorney. This interpretation seems more consistent with the policy of
work product for it was not intended to suppress evidence but only to
protect those materials which were of little evidentiary value, that is,
matters clothed with the attorney's legal interpretation. Although there
is little appellate authority on the issue, the Sixth Circuit has adopted this
interpretation and has held that Hickman does not apply to information
obained by an expert engaged by counsel."
Facts v. Opinions.
One of the most frequent arguments advanced concerning the per-
missible scope of discovery is the distinction betweer facts and opinions."0
The scope of permissible discovery is set forth in the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. Although Rule 26(b) appears to be confined to depo-
sitions, it seems fair to say that it is now generally considered as defining
the limits of the entire discovery procedure. Under Rule 26 (b) discovery
is permitted of any party having knowledge of relevant unprivileged
matters. No distinction is made between facts and opinions. In 1946,
the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure pro-
posed an amendment to exempt from discovery all reports containing
expert opinions." The amendment aroused a great deal of controversy,
and the Supreme Court declined to adopt it, choosing rather to grant
certiorari in Hickman and, thereby, express its views." Consequently
when Hickman came before the Court there was no distinction in the
Rules.
The Supreme Court in discussing Rule 26(b) substituted the word
18. See, e.g., E. I. Dupont De Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 24 F.R.D.
416 (D. Del. 1959).
19. Sachs v. Aluminum Co. of America, 167 F.2d 570 (6th Cir. 1948).
20. See, e.g., United States v. Certain Parcels of Land, 25 F.R.D. 192 (N.D. Cal.
1959); Hickey v. United States, 18 F.R.D. 88 (E.D. Pa. 1952).
21. Armstrong, Report of the Advisory Committee on tCe Federal Rides of Civil
Procedure Recommending Amendments, 5 F.R.D. 339, 356.
22. Ibid.
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"facts" for the word "matters" on three occasions while retaining "mat-
ters" several times. If it were the Court's intention in so doing to adopt
indirectly the proposed amendment, the cases are correct in denying
opinion discovery. However, this interpretation is doubtful when the
following factors are considered collectively. (1) The Court could have
accepted the amendment immediately prior to its decision, but it refused
to do so. (2) In Hickmcn, the subject matter of discovery was facts, and
not opinions. (3) In light of the Court's self-imposed jurisdictional
limitation that it will not decide issues unless necessary to a determina-
tion of the case, it is apparent that the word "facts" was used solely be-
cause it was the subject matter in issue. The question of opinion dis-
covery was not before the Court, and was not decided.
The Court emphasized that all matters were not immune as work
product.23 If relevant and unprivileged, matters which could be admis-
sible as evidence might properly be discoverable.24 Herein lies the dis-
tinction between the work of the attorney and that of the expert, for
while the attorney's work product is not evidence, since it is colored by
his legal opinions, the conclusions of an expert witness often constitute
evidence in themselves. This is particularly the case in condemnation
where the facts are often meaningless when divorced from the conclusions
which they generate. The work product doctrine sought to protect the
attorney by immunizing his trial strategy, not to protect his client by sup-
pressing evidence useful to his adversary. Thus if an expert's observa-
tions and conclusions are only collectively meaningful, it would be in-
consistent with Hickman to permit discovery of the former while exclud-
ing the latter.
As previously mentioned,25 the Sixth Circuit has ruled that Hickman
does not apply to information obtained by an expert. Although no specific
reference was made to opinions, subsequent cases citing it as authority
have permitted discovery of the expert's opinions and conclusions."
Confusion.
The confusion argument which has been adopted by several courts
in condemnation cases27 was articulated in Lewis v. United Air Lines
Transport Corp." as follows:
23. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947).
24. Ibid.
25. See note 19 supra.
26. See, e.g., United States v. Nysco Laboratories, Inc., 26 F.R.D. 159 (E.D.N.Y.
1960).
27. See, e.g., United States v. 900.57 Acres of Land, 30 F.R.D. 512 (W.D. Ark
1962); Lewis v. United Air Lines Transport Corp., 32 F. Supp. 21 (W.D. Pa. 1940).
28. 32 F. Supp. 21 (W.D. Pa. 1940).
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To permit parties to examine expert witnesses of the other
party in land condemnation and patent actions, where the evi-
dence clearly all comes from expert witnesses, would cause con-
fusion and probably would violate that provision of Rule 1
which provides that the rules 'shall be construed to secure the
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.'29
Two of the primary purposes of discovery are to narrow the issues
and to ascertain relevant matters. Consequently the confusion argument
is two-fold. First, since discovery is intended to narrow the issues, there
is no need for discovery in condemnation cases where there is only one
issue, just compensation. Second, since expert testimony is the only evi-
dence involved, it will all be revealed at the trial, so there is no danger of
an incomplete determination of the case. Because the parties may cross-
examine their adversaries' witnesses, there will be no unfair advantage,
and the trial will be expedited in accordance with Rule 1. The latter
proposition presupposes that cross-examination of expert witnesses is a
sufficient substitute for discovery. If both parties are fully apprised of
the facts and the issue is not in doubt, one might conclude that the ex-
pert's opinion of value is of secondary importance and may be adequately
examined at trial. However, this contention overlooks the hazardous
element of surprise. The discovery procedures were created on the as-
sumption that issues could be most equitably resolvd by preventing sur-
prise. The same set of facts may lead two experts to very divergent con-
clusions. Their opinions are based, not only upon the objective facts, but
more importantly upon their assessment of the facts in terms of dollars
and cents, and a factor of relative importance to one appraiser may seem
insignificant to another. In this sense the facts are still in dispute at the
time of trial, and the element of surprise is a real threat. Consequently,
discovery would serve, not to create confusion, but to prevent it by an
early disclosure of those facts on which there is disagreement. This
would permit the parties to concentrate on those issues in dispute thereby
aiding the jury's determination.
Information Equally Available to Both Parties.
The statement that information which is equally available to both
parties is not a proper subject of discovery has appeared in several cases.8"
Before this argument may be accepted as authoritative on the issue of
denial of opinion discovery, it must be determined exactly what informa-
29. Id. at 23.
30. See, e.g., United States v. 6.82 Acres of Land, 18 F.R.D. 195 (D. N.M. 1955);
United States v. 7,534.04 Acres of Land, 18 F.R.D. 146 (N.D. Ga. 1954).
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tion is being sought in these condemnation cases. If the condemnee is
inquiring as to factual criteria for the Government's valuation, and these
facts are readily available to him (perhaps as a matter of public record)
there is obviously little need for discovery. If he is seeking the opinion
of an expert who is otherwise available to him, discovery serves no pur-
pose. However, it would be rare indeed for an expert to avail both
parties of his services, so this is certainly not the situation contemplated
in the argument. Those who oppose opinion discovery maintain that the
information sought to be discovered is an appraised valuation of just
compensation which the discovering party could obtain merely by employ-
ing any real estate appraiser. However, the district court in United States
V. 23.76 Acres of Land"' challenged this proposition as follows:
There is no basis to believe that the information [expert's
opinion] sought to be elicited, since it is subjective in nature,
might be obtained by the defendants except by questions being
answered by the only person, the expert, who has such informa-
tion.32
In other words, it is not merely any theory of appraisal which the
condemnee wishes to discover, it is the particular theory which the Gov-
ernment has adopted and which it will rely on at trial. Reliance on the
adversary system presumes that controversies can be best resolved by the
give and take of challenge and rebuttal. As stated by the Supreme Court
in Hickman v. Taylor:
No longer can the time-honored cry of 'fishing expedition'
serve to preclude a party from inquiring into the facts under-
lying his opponent's case. Mutual knowledge of all the relevant
facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper litigation.33
Unfairness.
The argument that permitting discovery is unfair to the opposing
party consists of two propositions which deserve separate consideration.
First, complete discovery would promote laziness and impede proper rep-
resentation of the litigants' interest in that attorneys would hesitate to
obtain expert testimony knowing that they would have to disclose it to
their opponents."4 If discovery, which is intended to aid in the proper
resolution of cases, in fact hinders it, this argument is persuasive. A
31. 32 F.R.D. 593 (D. Md. 1963).
32. Id. at 596.
33. 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947).
34. See, e.g., Schuyler v. United Air Lines, Inc., 10 F.R.D. 111 (M.D. Pa. 1950).
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policy of playing a "waiting game" would result in a trial of complex is-
sues with no expert testimony and would obviously serve no one's in-
terests. Furthermore, with the knowledge that no qualified technician
would be present to challenge their contentions, both parties would be
encouraged to submit unreasonably biased theories of compensation, thus
diminishing the probability of a just resolution of the case. The asser-
tion that discovery promotes laziness is inapplicable in condemnation cases
in which expert testimony is indispensable. Aware that expert evidence
must often be utilized in order to prevail at trial, attorneys will em-
ploy testimony which is subject to discovery by their adversaries rather
than risk losing the case.8"
Second, complete discovery constitutes taking art opponent's property
without just compensation.36 This argument must be measured against
the fact that discovery in condemnation is intended to insure that the
condemnee's property will not be taken without just compensation. The
resulting conflict suggests the need for an examination of the policy con-
siderations emphasized by the district court in United States v. 364.82
Acres of Land. 7 That court held that unfairness to the adversary could
be resolved by requiring mutual discovery" or, if necessary, by condi-
tioning discovery upon a sharing of the adversary's expenses.3"
II. OTHER POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
In United States v. 364.82 Acres of Land the court declared that the
exercise of the right of eminent domain "carries with it the correlative
duty to protect individual rights to the fullest possible extent."4 If such
a policy of maximum protection is inherent in eminmt domain, it would
seem that the Government should not be permitted to withhold relevant
information which would, if discovered, enable the condemnee to obtain
that protection.
Two fifth amendment sources for such a policy can be suggested:
the specific provision that prevents the property of a citizen being taken
for any purpose except a public use upon the payment of just compensa-
tion and the general guaranty that prevents taking cven for a public use
without due process. The specific provision prescribes the requirements
35. Note, Developments in. the Lau-Discovery, 74 HARV. L. REv. 940, 1032 (1961);
Note, Discoz,cry-Opinion of Adverse Party's Prospective Appraiser-Witness Discover-
able as of Right, 111 U. PA. L. Rav. 509, 511 (1963).
36. See, e.g., United States v. Certain Parcels of Land, '(8 F.R.D. 98 (M.D. Ga.
1955).
37. 38 F.R.D. 411 (N.D. Cal. 1965).
38. Id. at 415.
39. Id. at 416.
40. Id. at 413.
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of substantive due process, and the general guaranty insures procedural
due process. The questions are, therefore, what is due process in eminent
domain and what are the requirements of just compensation?
At early common law, property was appropriated by the Crown
through the proceeding of inquest of office.4 An officer of the county
wvas directed to inquire by a jury the damage which would result to the
Crown or others from the taking." However, the jury was not a com-
mon law jury of twelve presided over by a judge, but was a jury of no
determinate number presided over by a sheriff, coroner, or escheator.43
More importantly the proceeding was entirely ex parte; condemnees were
not required to be served with process or notified in any manner.44 Thus
at common law no concern for maximum protection is evident.
The first general condemnation statute, enacted by Congress in
1888, provided that the procedure should conform as nearly as possible
to that existing in the state within which the district court was located."5
Attempted conformity led to such confusion that by 1931 there were 269
different methods of judicial procedure and 56 methods of administra-
tive procedure for condemnation." In 1951 uniformity was established
by the adoption of Rule 71A of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
In one sense the Supreme Court's adoption of Rule 71A is suggestive of
a concern for maximum protection in eminent domain since individual
rights can be more adequately safeguarded by uniformity than by diver-
sification. A single procedure affords opportunity for the creation of
"a due process of eminent domain." However, the confusion which ex-
isted prior to 1951 is some evidence that the present uniform procedure
was adopted, not out of a concern for maximum protection, but simply
to avoid delay and uncertainty. 7 Moreover, under Rule 71A the Federal
Rules apply to condemnation proceedings in the same manner as they do
to all other civil actions unless otherwise provided.4" Therefore, no ad-
ditional safeguards were incorporated for the protection of individual
rights in eminent domain.
Although the district court in United States v. 364.82 Acres of
41. Atlantic & Pacific R.R. v. Mingus, 165 U.S. 413, 431 (1897).
42. Chesapeake & Ohio Canal Co. v. Union Bank, 5 Fed. Cas. 570, 572 (No. 2653)
(C.C.D.C. 1830).
43. Atlantic & Pacific R.R. v. Mingus, 165 U.S. 413, 431 (1897).
44. Chesapeake & Ohio Canal Co. v. Union Bank, 5 Fed. Cas. 570, 572 (No. 2653)
(C.C.D.C. 1830).
45. 25 Stat. 357.
46. First Report of Judicial Council of Michigan 55-56 (1931).
47. See, Armstrong, Report of the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure Recommending Amendments, 5 F.R.D. 339, 357.
48. FED. R. Civ. P. 71A(a).
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Land" cited United States v. Jones"0 for the proposition that the right of
eminent domain "carries with it a correlative duty to protect individual
rights to the fullest possible extent" it is difficult to draw that conclusion
in light of the following language by Justice Field in Jones:
There is nothing in the nature of the matter to be deter-
mined which calls for the establishment of any special tribunal
by the appropriating power. . . The proceeding for the ascer-
tainment of the value of the property. . . is merely an inquisi-
tion to establish a particular fact as a preliminary to the actual
taking; and it may be prosecuted before commissioners or spe-
cial boards or the courts with or without the intervention of a
jury, as the legislature may designate. All tht is required is
that it shall be conducted in some fair and just manner..
(Emphasis added.)
Nowhere in the opinion is there language indicative of maximum pro-
tection, and conducting the proceeding in "some fair and just manner"
is obviously not equivalent to protecting the condemnee's rights to the
fullest possible extent.
The Court has continually emphasized the broad discretionary power
of the legislature to establish any procedure consistent with ordinary
processes of law. 2 Of course legislative action is subject to judicial re-
view, but not apparently to the extent of guaranteeing maximum protec-
tion. The Court does not concern itself with whethcr the procedure is the
one best supported by reason or authority since the condemnee has no
right in any particular mode of procedure." Succeeding legislatures may
establish different procedures as long as the essential elements of protec-
tion discussed below are preserved. 4 Nor will the Court concern itself
49. 38 F.R.D. 411 (N.D. Cal. 1965).
50. 109 U.S. 513 (1883).
51. Id. at 519.
52. See, c.g., Backus v. Fort Street Union Depot Co., 159 U.S. 557, 569 (1898);
Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548, 593 (1897) ; County of Mobile v. Kimball, 102 U.S. 691,
703 (SSO) ; Secombe v. Railroad Co., 90 U.S. 108, 117-18 (1874).
53. Dohany v. Rogers, 281 U.S. 362, 369 (1930); Crane v. Hahlo, 258 U.S. 142,
147 (1922) ; Backus v. Fort Street Union Depot Co., 169 U.S. 557, 570 (1898).
54. Backus v. Fort Street Union Depot Co., 169 U.S. 557 (1898). Here the state
supreme court had held that the proper tribunal under the coademnation statute was a
common law jury presided over by a judge. The condemnee argued that all prior rulings
of the state courts had been to the effect that a jury of inquest, not a common law jury
was the proper tribunal. The Supreme Court ruled that the tact that one construction
had been placed upon a statute did not make that construction beyond change. A legis-
lature which has established a certain rule of procedure may s absequently repeal the act
and establish an entirely different procedure. Similarly, court,. may hold that their pre-
vious construction of a statute was error and thereby provide a different mode of pro-
cedure.
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with every error in computing damages even though the result is to give
the condemnee less than he deserves."
It is well established that due process is satisfied in eminent domain
if the condemnee has reasonable notice and reasonable opportunity to be
heard and to present his claim or defense. 6  To violate due process an
error must be "gross and obvious, coming close to the boundary of arbi-
trary action."" Had the Supreme Court deemed additional protection
requisite in condemnation, such safeguards could have been incorporated
into Rule 71A. As previously mentioned, however, the rule provides no
significant departure from the procedure governing all civil actions in
the federal courts.58
If a duty of maximum protection exists there is little evidence of it
either in the procedural history of eminent domain or in the Supreme
Court's pronouncements on due process in condemnation. However, in
addition to the general due process guaranty, the Constitution contains a
specific provision regarding eminent domain. Therefore, a duty of max-
imum protection may be found in the guaranty of just compensation.
Not unique to the Constitution, the substantive requirement of just
compensation was recognized in the natural law theories of Grotius 5 and
Puffendorf. ° Indeed, according to natural law advocates, the require-
ment of just compensation existed prior to Magna Charta and was
guarded by article 39 which provided that no individual should be de-
prived of his property, but by the law of the land, and by the judgmient
of his peers. 6 Perhaps the natural law theory suggests a requirement of
maximum protection since it regards just compensation as an inalienable
right which would exist even without constitutional provisions. 2 Under
55. Roberts, Receiver v. New York City, 295 U.S. 264, 277 (1935); Marchant v.
Pennsylvania R.R., 153 U.S. 380 (1894). "We are permitted only to inquire whether
the trial court prescribed any rule for the guidance of the jury that was in absolute dis-
regard of the company's right to just compensation." Chicago, Burlington & Quincy
R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 247 (1897).
56. Dohany v. Rogers, 281 U.S. 362, 369 (1930) ; Appleby v. City of Buffalo, 221
U.S. 524, 532 (1911) ; Backus v. Fort Street Union Depot Co., 169 U.S. 557, 569 (1898);
Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548, 593 (1897).
57. Roberts, Receiver v. New York City, 295 U.S. 264, 277 (1935). There must
be "absolute disregard" of the condemnee's rights. Appleby v. City of Buffalo, 221 U.S.
524, 531 (1911); Backus v. Fort Street Union Depot Co., 169 U.S. 557, 565 (1898);
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 247 (1897). Due process
is not lacking unless "plain rights" have been ignored. McGovern v. City of New York,
229 U.S. 363, 373 (1913).
58. See note 48 supra.
59. De .ure Belli et Pacis bk. VIII, ch. 14, § 7 (1625).
60. De .ure Naturae et Gentium bk. VIII, ch. 5, § 7 (1672).
61. Parham v. The Justices, 9 Ga. 341, 349 (1851) ; Young v. McKenzie, 3 Ga. 31,
42 (1847) ; Gardner v. Village of Newburgh, 2 Johns. Ch. R. 162, 166 (N.Y. 1816).
62. Henry v. Dubuque & Pacific R.R., 10 Iowa 540, 543-44 (1860); Young v.
McKenzie, 3 Ga. 31, 40 (1847) ; Sinnickson v. Johnson, 17 N.J.L. 129, 145-46 (1839).
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this theory just compensation is not simply a limitation upon the power
of eminent domain, it is an essential element of its meaning, since there
is an implied agreement to make just compensation inherent in the exer-
cise of eminent domain. 3
Although the natural law theory was prevalent in early state court
decisions, it has been generally abandoned since the passage of the four-
teenth amendment and the adoption of specific provisions for compen-
sation in the state constitutions, both of which afford the courts a con-
stitutional basis for their decisions. It seems reasonable to expect a re-
newed emphasis upon natural law as a justification for maximum pro-
tection in light of the contemporary concern for individual rights. At
present, however, the sovereignty theory of eminent domain has gained
wide acceptance, particularly in decisions of the Supreme Court. 4 Under
this theory which recognizes eminent domain as an inherent power neces-
sary to the very existence of government, there is no requirement of com-
pensation in the absence of specific constitutional language. "  As a
sovereign power it would exist without limitation; therefore, compensa-
tion is simply a condition upon, rather than an essential element of, emi-
nent domain."0 This theory suggests a concern for insuring maximum
public welfare in a manner least damaging to the individual.
Regardless of which theory is accepted as authority, it does not
necessarily follow that there is a duty of maximum protection to the
condemnee, for in eminent domain there are conflicting considerations
for which the policy argument fails to account. The Government has an
obligation to the public which it represents as well as a responsibility to
the condemnee. First, it has a duty as trustee of public funds to see that
the compensation is just to the public as well as to the individual,6 7 and
the resulting tension has been thus described:
On the one hand it (the fifth amendment) contemplates
that the monies paid into the common treasury by the taxpayers
shall be jealously guarded as a public trust a.ainst unfounded
and unjust claims. On the other, it guarantees that the Govern-
63. Sinnickson v. Johnson, 17 N.J.L. 129, 145 (1839); Gardner v. Village of New-
burgh, 2 Johns. Ch. R. 162, 168 (N.Y. 1816).
64. Georgia v. Chattanooga, 264 U.S. 472, 480 (1924); H,.nson Co. v. United States,
261 U.S. 581, 587 (1923) ; United States v. Jones, 109 U.S. 513, 518 (1883) ; Boom Co. v.
Patterson, 98 U.S. 403, 406 (1878) ; Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367, 371-74 (1875).
65. United States v. Jones, 109 U.S. 513, 518 (1883).
66. Hanson Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 581, 587 (1923); Long Island Water
Supply Co. v. Brooklyn, 166 U.S. 685, 689 (1897) ; United States v. Jones, 109 U.S. 513,
518 (1883) ; Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 403, 406 (1878).
67. Searl v. Lake County School District, 133 U.S. 553, 562 (1890) ; Garrison v.
City of New York, 88 U.S. 196, 204 (1874).
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ment, having regard for the rights and welfare of its citizens
. . . shall deal fairly and equitably with each of them."
Second, it has a responsibility to the public arising from the nature
of the power of eminent domain:
When the existence of a particular power in the Govern-
ment is recognized on the ground of necessity, no delegation of
the legislative power by the people can be held to vest authority
in the department which holds it in trust to bargain away such
power or to so tie up the hands of government as to preclude its
repeated exercise, as often and under such circumstances as the
needs of government may require. . . . It must follow that any
legislative bargain in restraint of the complete, continuous, and
repeated exercise of the right of eminent domain is unwarranted
and void .... 6"
It may be that a policy affording maximum protection to the condemnee
would result in an imbalance of fairness adverse to the public interest.
If in granting concessions to condemnees the procedure encouraged them
to litigate spurious claims,"0 condemnation funds could be subjected to
possible abuse. This might certainly influence taxpayer interest in con-
demnation projects and, in this respect, would constitute an unwarranted
restraint on the right of eminent domain. Therefore, in providing fair-
ness to the condemnee, the public interest must also be safeguarded.
A concern for the public interest is evident in several rules announced
by the courts. Even though the condemnee may not contest the taking as
long as it is for a public use, he is, nonetheless, required to accept as a
set-off to his compensation any benefits accruing to his remaining land
from the proposed public use.7 If the jury should fail to set-off such
benefits, its award would not constitute the just compensation intended
by the fifth amendment." 2 Furthermore, although the condemnee is an
innocent party who may be compelled to litigate due to error in the Gov-
ernment's appraisal, he is not entitled to reimbursement either for the
loss of time spent in prosecuting his claim or for his attorney's fees and
68. United States v. One Parcel of Land, 131 F. Supp. 443, 444 (D.D.C. 1955).
69. 2 CooLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 1111-12 (8th ed. 1927). Accord,
Georgia v. Chattanooga, 264 U.S. 472, 480 (1924).
70. If, for example, the condemnee could discover the Government's expert with-
out securing his own expert or paying the Government's expenses or being liable for
court costs, he might be encouraged to litigate an unfounded claim on the chance that
he might succeed by assailing the Government's appraisal and confusing the jury.
71. United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 376 (1942); McCoy v. Union Elevated
R.R., 247 U.S. 354, 366-67 (1918) ; Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548, 569-86 (1897).
72. Chesapeake & Ohio Canal Co. v. Key, 5 Fed. Cas. 563, 564 (No. 2649)
(C.C.D.C. 1829).
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expenses. 3 Finally, notwithstanding the fact that condemnation trials
are often technical and complex, Rule 71A permits the saving of public
funds by allowing joinder of parties and properties in a single cause of
action."4
Although an historical analysis of due process and just compensation
indicates that there is no duty of maximum protection the question re-
mains whether such a duty should exist. The taking of private property
for public use is not in derogation of common right since the right of the
public has been recognized in the Constitution and is as much common
right as that of the individual."5 Nonetheless, the public certainly owes
some duty of fairness to the condemnee. Unlike the power of taxation
which is levied upon an entire populace or class according to some rule of
apportionment, the power of eminent domain involves a forced contribu-
tion beyond the individual's proportional share to the general welfare."6
This suggests good reason for fair play in eminent domain to guard
against inequities in the cost of supporting government. Consequently,
the fifth amendment guaranty of just compensation might indicate a miti-
gation of this inequity by distribution of the expense throughout the
community. On the other hand, the power of eminemt domain exists for
the public benefit, and condemnation funds must be carefully guarded as
a public trust." In light of this conflict of governmental interests it
seems appropriate to qualify the policy of maximum protection by hold-
ing that the exercise of the power of eminent domain carries with it a
correlative duty to protect individual rights to the tullest possible extent
consistent with the Government's responsibility to the public interest. The
most that can be said is that the fifth amendment provides an underlying
policy of fairness-not necessarily maximum protection-which because
of the peculiar nature of the condemnation proceeding (which will be dis-
cussed below) may justify discovery of an opponent's report.
While the argument of maximum protection addressed itself to the
right of eminent domain, the court in United States v. 364.82 Acres of
Land" also made a policy statement concerning the nature of the condem-
nation proceeding by which the right is exercised. The court, in assum-
ing arguendo that expert witnesses were within the scope of the work
73. Dohany v. Rogers, 281 U.S. 362, 368 (1930) ; United States v. 15.3 Acres of
Land, 158 F. Supp. 122, 125 (M.D. Pa. 1957) ; United States v. 254.35 Acres of Land,
46 F. Supp. 913, 914 (W.D. La. 1942).
74. FED. R. Civ. P. 71A(b).
75. Chesapeake & Ohio Canal Co. v. Key, 5 Fed. Cas. 563, 566 (No. 2649)
(C.C.D.C. 1829).
76. Beeland Wholesale Co. v. Kaufman, 234 Ala. 249, 174 So. 516 (1937).
77. See note 67 supra.
78. 38 F.R.D. 411 (N.D. Cal. 1965).
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product privilege of Hickman v. Taylor,79 emphasized that work product
was not an absolute immunity but merely a qualified privilege which
could be overcome by a showing of "necessity or justification"; and, said
the court, "such necessity or justification is inherent in every eminent do-
main case.""0  Indirectly, this stands for the proposition that expert
opinions are discoverable as of right in every condemnation proceeding,
for under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allowance of discovery
is the general rule in the absence of a recognized exception. As applied
to the Rules, a showing of "necessity or justification" would permit the
condemnee to take the expert's deposition under Rule 26 and to obtain
the appraisal report by means of a subpoena duces tecunt under Rule 45.8"
Although the court in United States v. 364.82 Acres of Land did not
develop its policy argument, there are several aspects to the condemnation
proceeding which suggest that "necessity or justification" requisite for
discovery. The expert witness in condemnation proceedings occupies a
position of significance unequalled in other areas of litigation, with the
possible exception of patent litigation. Expert opinions are employed in
other fields of litigation, but the verdict is the result of additional testi-
mony by other witnesses and the conversion of the expert's conclusions
into dollars and cents. However, in the condemnation case where the
right to condemn is unquestioned, the sole issue is just compensation, and,
for all practical purposes, the sole witness is the expert appraiser. There-
fore, the power traditionally vested in the trier of fact is "delegated" to
the witness himself. He speaks to the jury directly in terms of dollars
and cents. Indeed, it remains the prerogative of the trier of fact to ac-
cept his theory or reject it in favor of that of the adversary expert, yet,
in either event, the compensation is established by the witness.
The presentation of direct testimony is merely a part of the expert's
importance in condemnation. Due to the complexity of the issue, one set
of facts may result in two widely contrasting opinions of value. Differ-
ent formulas might be employed, different comparisons relied upon, and
a factor of significance to one expert might be minimized by another.
This poses an obvious problem since the trier of fact probably lacks the
ability to recognize errors in such technical testimony. As a result the
trier of fact must depend upon adversary experts to refute theories when
it lacks the requisite knowledge to challenge them. Cross-examination
in condemnation, therefore, assumes particular significance and refuta-
tion of seemingly obvious defects in the adversary's theory may be as im-
79. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
80. 38 F.R.D. 411, 415 (N.D. Cal. 1965).
81. See, Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 504 (1947).
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portant to success as adequate preparation of one's own case. Clearly the
discovery procedure is evidence of a concern for well prepared cross-
examination, and the need for pre-trial disclosure seems most immediate
when experts, as opposed to lay witnesses are involved, in light of the dif-
ficulty in cross-examining technicians on complex issues. One party's
expert may honestly disagree with the adversary expert, but complete
refutation of the adversary expert's appraisal often requires detailed re-
search by one's own technician. 2 Moreover, competent cross-examination
requires sufficient time for consultation and for education of the ex-
amining attorney by his own expert.8 3 The need for discovery for the
purpose of cross-examination, therefore, seems obvious in the condemna-
tion proceeding.
Another policy consideration is that discovery will encourage out-of-
court settlements. While the encouragement of settlements is generally re-
garded as one beneficial concomitant of discovery, settlements due to dis-
covery of appraisal reports in condemnation proceedings are most likely
to occur because of the pre-eminent position of the expert testimony.
In England the importance of pre-trial discovery in condemnation is
recognized by a specific provision for mandatory discovery. Under the
Lands Tribunal Rules adversaries are required to submit their appraisal
reports to the tribunal for mutual exchange at the pre-trial stage.84 If
one party attempts to place in evidence reports which have not been dis-
closed to his adversary, the tribunal must adjourn che proceeding unless
satisfied that no party will be prejudiced."
In condemnation, the jury must rely upon experts, not only to pre-
sent educated testimony on highly technical issues, but also to refute un-
sound theories of valuation on rebuttal. Well prepared cross-examination
affords the jury an objective standard for resolving an extremely specu-
lative issue. Denial of discovery certainly diminishes the reliability of
that standard. In this sense there would seem to be inherent in every
condemnation case the "necessity or justification" requisite for discovery.
82. Winner, Procedural Methods to Attahit Discovery, 28 F.R.D. 97, 103.
83. Ibid.
84. 10 HALsBuRY, LAws OF ENGLAND 175 (3d ed. 1955).
85. Id. at 176.
